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The Struggle for Truth: Unveiling Efforts to Discredit the History and Stability of Kosova

English Publications

Dr. Gurakuç KUÇI

“OCTOPUS” Institute / gurakuq.kuqi@octopusinstitute.org

Abstract:

This paper examines three cases of espionage arrests in Kosovo, involving two Serbian individuals and two Albanians linked to the Serbian Information and Security Agency (BIA). The aim of these spies was to discredit the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), alter the narrative of the Reçak massacre, create a “yellow house” similar to the one in northern Albania, and destabilize the state of Kosovo by inciting interethnic conflicts. Through the analysis of specific cases and motivation theories, this paper sheds light on the reasons why individuals engage in espionage against their own country, Serbia’s efforts to manipulate the history and stability of the region and the tendencies to invade Kosovo.

Keywords: espionage, BIA, AKI, KLA, yellow house, Serbia, interethnic conflicts, NATO.

1.   Introduction

The Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), in cooperation with other security entities, has successfully uncovered and apprehended four spies connected to the Serbian Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). The arrests included two Serbian national and two ethnic Albanians, who were detained in two separate cases.

The primary objectives of the two ethnic Albanian individuals linked to BIA were to damage the reputation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), discredit the Reçak massacre, provoke interethnic conflicts, and sully NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. In 2009, three individuals connected to BIA were captured in Kosovo. Later, another individual was identified as a member of a group aiming to fabricate and compensate false witnesses concerning the alleged case of organ trafficking by the KLA. Surprisingly, this individual held official positions within the state apparatus of Kosovo.

Serbia has consistently engaged in espionage activities against Kosovo, and the recent revelations are just a small part of its operations. It has recently been uncovered that Russia, through Serbian agents, has also influenced politicians and institutions of the European Union. Therefore, these actions are well-planned and strategically targeted. To uncover the objectives of this country, we have engaged in studying recent cases and a 2009 espionage case, including the theoretical framework.

This study employs a qualitative research approach, analyzing specific cases of espionage arrests and investigative materials obtained from open sources. By combining the analysis of open sources, regional circumstances, and Serbia’s approach against Kosovo, the study aims to understand the motives and strategic goals of individuals involved in espionage. Theories of motivation, psychological and social factors are used to interpret the behaviors and decisions of the spies.

The research question of the paper is: “What are the main reasons and motivations that lead individuals to engage in espionage against their country, and how does this affect Serbia’s efforts to manipulate the history and stability of Kosovo?”

The dependent variable of the paper is: “Serbia’s strategic goals against Kosovo through espionage”.

2.   Reasons Why People Engage in Espionage against Their Country

2.1.         Theories of Motivation

  • Rational Choice Theory: This theory suggests that individuals make decisions based on their personal interests (Scott, 2000). In the context of espionage, an individual may choose to work for another country if they believe that the benefits, such as financial gain or personal advancement, outweigh the risks and potential consequences.
  • Social Exchange Theory: This theory states that individuals engage in behaviors based on the rewards and costs associated with those behaviors (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). In the case of espionage, an individual might weigh the potential benefits (e.g., financial gain, personal satisfaction) against the costs (e.g., legal consequences, social ostracism) and decide that the benefits outweigh the costs.
  • Psychological Factors: Psychological factors such as the desire for power, a sense of loyalty to another country, or a need for excitement and adventure can also motivate individuals to engage in espionage (Wilder, 2017).

2.2.         Additional Factors

  • Personal Circumstances: Individuals facing financial difficulties, personal crises, or other challenges may be more susceptible to promises of financial gains or other benefits offered by a foreign government.
  • Loyalty and Identity: Individuals who feel detached from their country or have a strong sense of loyalty to another country may be more inclined to engage in espionage.
  • Opportunity and Ease: The availability of opportunities and the ease of access to sensitive information can also influence an individual’s decision to engage in espionage.
  • Cultural and Social Factors: Cultural and social factors such as a lack of national pride, the concept of postcolonial image, or the desire to be part of a larger community can also contribute to an individual’s decision to engage in espionage.
  • Brainwashing and Manipulation: In some cases, individuals may be coerced or manipulated into engaging in espionage through psychological manipulation, blackmail, or other forms of coercion.

3.   Two Identities, One Spy

Since 2002, a Serbian spy, Marko Knezhevic, is suspected to have operated in Kosovo under the pseudonym “Drugi Crni”, posing as a journalist for “TV Most” based in Zvecan. On May 30, 2024, the Kosovo Police arrested Knezhevic following an investigation and discovery by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. The arrest occurred due to Knezhevic’s use of dual identities, as his Serbian and Kosovar passports did not match (Teve, 2024).

Foto 1: Marko Knezhević, arrested as a BIA spy, was operating in Kosovo under the camouflage of a TV MOST journalist

This arrest sheds light on Serbia’s clandestine operations in Kosovo, highlighting the ongoing efforts of the Serbian country to undermine regional stability. Knezhevic’s involvement with “TV Most” highlights the strategic use of media to disseminate propaganda and manipulate public opinion. Posing as a journalist, he was able to gather intelligence and spread disinformation, serving Serbia’s interests and likely organizing and aiding terrorist groups such as the “Northern Brigades” and “Bridge Guards”. Knezhevic was a close associate who reported to Aleksandar Vulin, current Deputy Prime Minister in the Serbian government, former Minister of Internal Affairs, and former director of BIA.

The presence of advanced technological devices in Knezhevic’s possession suggests that Serbia has heavily invested in sophisticated surveillance and espionage tools. This underscores the country’s commitment to covert operations designed to compromise Kosovo’s security and sovereignty. Furthermore, Knezhevic’s dual identities in Kosovo and Serbian passports raise questions about the extent of Serbia’s infiltration into Kosovo’s social and institutional life.

This discovery has significant implications for regional security, suggesting that Serbia has been able to penetrate Kosovo’s structures and gather sensitive information.

4.   KIA uncovers two “Good Albanians” serving Serbia to distort the history of war

The Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI), following an investigation and collection of incriminating data,

has testified before the Supreme Court of Kosovo, engaging in legal actions leading to the arrest of two individuals, Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi, on charges of collaboration with the Serbian Information and Security Agency (BIA). Evidence gathered by KIA indicates that these individuals were actively undermining Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the historical narrative of Kosovo’s war.

Bedri Shabani, a former customs officer during Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in the 1990s, and Muharrem Qerimi, a former official of the Kosovo Police until after Kosovo’s independence declaration, who was dismissed from this institution due to misuse of a confiscated vehicle, were found to have mutual contacts within BIA, specifically with Serdjan Rosic, a Serbian from Ferizaj. The latter is a familiar name from Bogolub Janicevic’s testimony in The Hague. The primary goal of these detainees was to manipulate evidence and orchestrate witnesses against the KLA.

Foto 2: Bedri Shabani, arrested as a BIA spy

Bedri Shabani, a former customs officer during Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in the 1990s, and Muharrem Qerimi, a former official of the Kosovo Police until after Kosovo’s independence declaration, who was dismissed from this institution due to misuse of a confiscated vehicle, were found to have mutual contacts within BIA, specifically with Serdjan Rosic, a Serbian from Ferizaj. The latter is a familiar name from Bogolub Janicevic’s testimony in The Hague. The primary goal of these detainees was to manipulate evidence and orchestrate witnesses against the KLA.

Bedri Shabani, in particular, has been actively involved in Serbia’s efforts to distort the history of the Reçak massacre. Serbia has continuously promoted its narrative that the Reçak massacre was staged by the KLA and the international community. The main objective of this historical revisionism is to undermine NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, prompted by the Reçak massacre and William Walker’s response. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was a response to the genocide perpetrated by the Serbian state against Albanians in Kosovo under Slobodan Milosevic’s leadership.

According to current information, Bedri Shabani played a significant role in this disinformation campaign. He attempted to create a replica of the “yellow house” similar to the one in northern Albania, fabricating a narrative that the KLA engaged in human organ trafficking. Shabani’s strategic aim was to link the former KLA military hospital in the village of Mollopolc, Shtime, with the Reçak massacre, as these two villages are geographically close.

Muharrem Qerimi has consistently portrayed himself as an agent of British intelligence services. (T7, 2024)

Foto 3: The evidence where Serdjan Rosic is mentioned

4.1.         Discovery of Serbia’s Efforts to Distort Kosovo’s History

The recent arrest of Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) has shed light on Serbia’s ongoing efforts to distort Kosovo’s history and undermine its stability. These two individuals, suspected of working for the Serbian Information and Security Agency (BIA), were found to be actively involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating public opinion against Kosovo.

4.2. Background and Motivations

Shabani and Qerimi’s activities date back to the 1990s when they were employed in Serbian institutions, a time when Albanians were excluded from institutions and public life in former Yugoslavia. Shabani worked in Serbia’s regime as a customs officer and after the war primarily lived outside Kosovo, while Qerimi was dismissed from the Kosovo Police for misuse of a seized vehicle and later engaged in the real estate sector, presenting himself as someone powerful working for KIA or another intelligence service.

4.3. Objectives and Methods

The primary goal of Shabani and Qerimi was to distort the history of the Reçak massacre, a key event in the Kosovo War. Serbia has continuously sought to impose its narrative that the massacre was staged by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the international community. Particularly, Shabani has been involved in this campaign, attempting to fabricate a “yellow house” similar to where the KLA is accused of trafficking human organs. His aim was the strategic alignment of the location and connection between the facility and the massacre with the former KLA military hospital in the village of Mollopolc, near Reçak.

4.4.         Contacts and Operations

Shabani and Qerimi had contacts with BIA both physically and through other channels via Serdjan Rosic. Recently, they had attempted to organize an ethnic incident in Kosovo similar to those in the 1980s, 1990s, or post-war periods. This suggests they were part of a larger network aimed at destabilizing the region.

Implications and Consequences

The arrest of Shabani and Qerimi has significant implications for the security and stability of Kosovo. Their activities were designed to harm the state of Kosovo and undermine its international reputation. Furthermore, their malicious plan against William Walker, a key figure in the international community, highlights the extent of Serbia’s efforts to manipulate and intimidate.

Foto 4: Srdjan Rosic, the Serbian BIA agent

4.5.         Denial by BIA

The arrest of Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi serves as a harsh reminder of Serbia’s ongoing efforts to distort Kosovo’s history and undermine its stability. AKI’s investigation has uncovered a complex network of disinformation and manipulation aimed at harming Kosovo and its international reputation. The Serbian BIA’s denial of any communication or collaboration with the two arrested individuals (САОПШТЕЊЕ 05.06.2024. Безбедно-информативна Агенција, n.d.) is a clear indication of their involvement in these activities and their panic over the exposure and counter-exposure of Serbian intentions. The international community must remain vigilant and continue to support Kosovo in its efforts to counter Serbia’s destabilizing activities.

5.   Discovery of interceptions: Conspiracy for ethnical destabilization in Kosovo

In a published telephone interception by GeoPost, a conversation between Bedri Shabani and Serdjan Rosic reveals several key details, despite certain parts being censored. The conversation, though brief in its public release, provides us with significant insights:

  • The conversation took place one day after the incident in Banjska, confirmed by references to events from the previous day.
  • There is a clear discussion about inciting ethnical incidents, mentioning others inflaming the situation, while they add fuel to exacerbate it.
  • Shabani inquires Rosic about the progress of the “films”, implying preparations for various issues against Kosovo.
  • Shabani expresses concerns among his friends, suggesting there is a supportive group around him.
  • He seeks approval from Rosic to incite something or to let it “sleep”.
  • Rosic assures him that he will convey all his requests and words.
  • The conversation occurred from Gracanica, as Shabani mentions stopping there to discuss before continuing the journey to Pristina.
  • Shabani has suspicious connections with many people, mentioning he does not register phone numbers but remembers them (TheGeoPost, 2024).

GeoPost has also published a second interception of Bedri Shabani with Sedjan Rosic, where we obtain further new information:

  • It is confirmed from the conversation that they physically met a few days before the interception in the city of Nis, Serbia on 17.05.2023.
  • The phone call has happened on 23.05.2023, where it is learned that Rosic has professional connections with “another colleague”, Bogoljub Janicijevic, who in 1999 was the head of the so-called “Secretariat of Internal Affairs” for Ferizaj.
  • During the conversation, it is revealed that on the day of the meeting with BIA in Nis, Shabani had handed over three texts. The audio is censored, and it is unknown what those texts are!
  • Regarding this, Shabani had asked, “Have you had a chance to see them before?” to which Rosic responds with “no” (The GeoPost, 2024).

5.1.         Analysis of the Conversation

This telephone interception presents a clear and present danger to the internal stability of Kosovo. The discussion on ethnical incidents and preparations against Kosovo suggests a coordinated strategy for destabilization. The involvement of a supportive group around Shabani, who are concerned, indicates he has a wide network of collaborators who may be engaged in subversive activities.

Rosic’s assurance to convey Shabani’s requests indicates a close and effective cooperation between them, suggesting these activities are well-organized and planned. The fact that the conversation took place in Gracanica, an ethnically sensitive area, and the mention of the journey towards Pristina raises concerns about the spread of their influence throughout the region.

The second interception reveals well-coordinated coordination and a detailed plan for destabilizing Kosovo. Physical meetings, professional connections with important Serbian security figures, and involvement of intelligence services suggest a significant risk to regional stability. These activities are meticulously planned and organized, demanding special attention from Kosovar and international authorities to prevent any further escalation of the situation.

5.2.         Serbia’s Retaliation

In response to the arrest of BIA spies in Kosovo, Serbia appears to be employing a strategy of equivalence by arresting an individual from Leposavic, alleging that he betrayed his own people for 500 euros (Alo, 2024). Additionally, Serbia is fabricating other false information and disseminating it through pro-Vucic media outlets (Novosti, 2024).

6.   Shpend and Muharrem Qerimi: The Dark Past of Two Brothers

Muharrem Qerimi, who was arrested by the Kosovo Police upon the Prosecutor’s order following AKI’s revelation as a BIA operative, reveals that his and one of his brothers’ pasts have been in conflict with the law. Muharrem Qerimi served in the Kosovo Police as a serious crimes investigator until after Kosovo’s independence declaration, but due to misuse of his official position, he was dismissed from the Police.

Muharrem Qerimi’s brother, Shpend Qerimi, is in prison for an explosion at the Sekiraca nightclub many years ago and has been sentenced by the court to 25 years of imprisonment (IndeksOnline, 2024).

This report relies solely on confirmed sources, not alleged ones.

7.   Former Serbian Policeman, BIA Spy

A former member of the Kosovo Police from the Serbian community has been the latest arrestee by the Kosovo Police upon the order of the Special Prosecutor of Kosovo. Aleksandar Vlajic, after a several-month investigation by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, was revealed to be in the service of the Serbian BIA (Dukagjini, 2024). According to the prosecutor’s announcement, the arrest took place on the evening of June 26, 2024 (Dukagjini, 2024). According to information from the OCTOPUS Institute, in addition to sharing information with Serbia’s BIA, Vlajic also had a large network of information sources (Musliu, 2024). Vlajic’s espionage network extended to:

  • Kosovo Customs,
  • Serbian NGOs,
  • OSCE and UNMIK in northern Kosovo,
  • Certain international organizations in Pristina, and
  • Th e media in Gracanica (Musliu, 2024b).

Foto 5: The cooperative structure in espionage

8.   Three BIA Spies: Arrested by PK, Released by EULEX, Branislav Nikolic and Others

Three Serbs, two of whom were Serbian nationals and one from Kosovo, were arrested by the Kosovo Police in 2009 by the Directorate against Organized Crime in an operation conducted in Caglavica, Pristina. Igor Jucinac, Milutin Radanovic, and Predrag Zheljkovic were caught buying witnesses willing to testify against the KLA for the alleged organ trafficking case in the “yellow house” in northern Albania, where the KLA was accused of trafficking human organs.

According to interceptions and testimonies, they paid up to 100,000 euros to buy a witness who would falsely testify against the KLA. RTK had brought exclusive footage showing how these individuals were attempting to buy witnesses (RTK, 2020).

At that time, EULEX, utilizing its guaranteed competencies, took over the case from Kosovo Police and Courts, then released them to defend themselves in freedom, but the individuals had fled Kosovo and never returned.

How they were released remains a true mystery, why the prosecutor released them when they were accused of serious criminal acts.

Igor Jocinac later apparently tried to return to Kosovo, but now as a healthcare worker, as he was found in the payroll list of the hospital in Sterpce, which was not functional but where 21 people were paid (Insider, 2019).

Branislav Nikolic’s involvement in this campaign against the KLA was also revealed. The latter is the brother of Bratislav Nikolic, who was mayor of Sterpce.

Bratislav Nikolic became mayor of Sterpce in 2009 with the Independent Liberal Party led by Slobodan Petrovic. In 2010, there was an attack on Nikolic’s house in Sterpce (B92, 2010). After the creation of the Serbian List with the Brussels Agreement, Nikolic moved to this political entity and in September 2015, Nikolic announced that about 3,000 citizens of Sterpce joined the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of Aleksandar Vucic and the Serbian List, saying that the then Prime Minister of Serbia and SNS President, Aleksandar Vucic, “deals with specific problems of citizens, had difficult Brussels negotiations and secured the formation of the Serbian Community of Municipalities” (Spalovic, 2015).

Apparently, Bratislav had influenced that his brother Branislav would advance to various positions in Kosovo. Branislav was appointed as a Board member at Kosovo Post Office by decision in 2012 (Insider, 2019). He was then appointed in 2016 as an advisor to former President of Kosovo Hashim Thaci, but was dismissed in June 2019 after less than four years of work, following revelations that he was part of the BIA (Voa, 2019).

Branislav Nikolic, as a candidate for deputy with the Serbian List for the Kosovo Assembly, managed in 2019 to become a deputy legally in the absence of a court decision on his guilt or innocence (Koha, 2019).

9.   Conclusion

The case of September 24, 2023, where Serbia launched a terrorist attack in northern Kosovo with the aim of returning that area under the control of terrorist groups led by Radojicic and then declaring it an autonomous zone, indicates that the spectrum of engagement in these actions is extensive and much larger than just the Banjska case.

With the revelation of interceptions involving Bedri Shabani and Srdjan Rosic, we discover that Serbia’s ambitions extend beyond just taking northern Kosovo; they aim to encompass the entire northeastern part of Kosovo. Therefore, it is no coincidence that they have established 48 military bases along the entire border with Kosova.

Serbia has not relinquished its claim over all of Kosovo’s territory, and in its ambitions, the ideal achievement would be the reconquest of Kosovo as a whole. However, realistically, they aim at least for northeastern Kosovo and possibly to annex the rest to Albania as a diminished territory. Hence, we can expect escalations of conflicts like those of Banjska or ethnic conflicts in other parts of Kosovo, as evidenced by Serbia’s goals heard in interceptions involving Shabani and Rosic.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that we also have the statement from Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic that they will wait for changes in geopolitical circumstances regarding the Kosovo issue. Thus, they await global conflicts to escalate and a change in the balance of forces and global interests.

However, achieving these strategic plans requires strategic actions through hybrid warfare, and these means are being employed at multiple levels by Serbia.

The case of Dick Marty, the drafter of the document alleging crimes by the KLA involving human organ trafficking in the “yellow house” in northern Albania, adds a new dimension to this complex situation. In 2020, Marty faced serious death threats from Serbian BIA, according to Swiss security authorities (SwissInfo, 2024). Although the BIA denied the assassination attempt on Marty (Vasques, 2022), as it denied its connections to the spies arrested in Kosovo, Marty continued to be protected by Swiss security forces, and his exits were under strict security, ultimately leading to his death in December 2023. Serbia’s aim in this assassination was to blame Albanians for Marty’s murder and thus further falsify facts about staged crimes for organ trafficking. Marty himself acknowledged the existence of this plan (SwissInfo, 2024).

Foto 6: Serbian military bases on the border with Kosova

This case illustrates that Serbia is willing to sacrifice anyone to achieve its objectives against Kosovo. In addition to Dick Marty’s case, we have their malign intentions towards William Walker, their readiness to sacrifice Serbs to stir up ethnic conflict in Kosovo, and the embezzlement of Serbian people’s money to create false propaganda through hybrid warfare.

After reviewing the events presented in the paper, it is clear that Serbia has several significant objectives within its strategic agenda:

  1. Reformulating the narrative of the Reçak Massacre: Serbia seeks to rewrite the historical cause of the Reçak Massacre, presenting it as an act committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), thereby absolving itself of responsibility.
    1. Discrediting NATO’s humanitarian intervention: Serbia aims to undermine NATO’s intervention legitimacy after the Reçak Massacre and other massacres, presenting it as a conspiracy against Serbia and questioning its justification.
    2. Delegitimizing Kosovo’s independence: By leaving aside the ICJ decision, Serbia seeks to undermine Kosovo’s legitimacy, arguing that international law has been violated.
    3. Victimization and Historical Revisionism: Serbia aims to portray its population as victims of past genocides, especially Nazi genocide and actions by Croatian Ustase against Serbs. By emphasizing these historical events, Serbia seeks to generate international sympathy and support for its actions in the region.

Thus, Serbia’s short-term and medium-term goals are designed to discredit and weaken the actions of Western powers, including NATO’s 1999 humanitarian intervention against Serbian military actions aimed at stopping genocide in Kosovo. This manipulation of the narrative aims to construct an alternative international history that aligns with Serbia’s interests, with encouragement from Russia and China to sully the actions of the USA, NATO, and Western countries worldwide and to strengthen the BRICS group.

While we have mentioned the long-term goals at the beginning of the conclusions. Serbia with the discovery of spies appears to be severely shaken due to the fact that it is revealed about their terrorist goals like in the Banjska case last year

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