SERBIA’S HOME IN A RUSSIAN WORLD
Janusz Bugajski
Under the rule of President Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia is desperately trying to imitate Russia. It seeks to be the dominant power in the Western Balkans and is mimicking Putin’s “Russian World” ideology with a smaller “Serbian world.” But the problem for Belgrade is twofold: its expansionist agenda will be resisted by all neighbors and international agencies, while its pursuit of “greatness” will ensure that Serbia becomes increasingly dependent on Moscow’s calculations.
In its Russian World (Russki mir) agenda, the Kremlin declares an obligation to defend all Russian speakers or people born in the Soviet Union and their descendants. This includes the right to intervene in the affairs of neighboring states and even the necessity of conquest and partition to allegedly protect Russians-speakers, as witnessed in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
In Serbia’s “younger brother” version of Srpski Svet, recently declared by Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin, all Serbs have the right to be united and live together in one state. Belgrade claims the right to protect Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosova, North Macedonia, and Croatia. In addition to political intervention on their behalf, this means expanding its army to ensure Serbian interests through military conquest. Just like Russians, the Serbs are portrayed as the long-suffering victims which foreign powers are conspiring to assimilate or eliminate.
Vučić’s Serbia acts like a deferential sibling toward Russia, viewing its “elder brother” as a tough and wise leader that can help junior achieve his regional ambitions. But under this fraternal surface, the Kremlin is manipulating Belgrade to serve its geopolitical interests through an unequal relationship based on four dependencies: diplomatic, economic, military, and political.
Serbia is diplomatically beholden to Russia and Belgrade has pledged its loyalty to Moscow. Among other acts of submission, the government has vowed never to impose economic sanctions on Russia, despite calls from the EU that Serbia must align its foreign policy with that of the bloc if it is serious about membership. Unlike Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania, Serbia did not join the Western embargo on Russia following its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine or the arrest of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Belgrade evidently does not view Ukraine as a brotherly Slavic state and is happy to eliminate political dissidents.
Vučić is permanently indebted to Putin for blocking Kosova’s entry into the United Nations and refusing to recognize its independence. The speaker of parliament Ivica Dačić has praised Russia as Serbia’s best ally that protects its “territorial integrity” and defends it in international fora. In stark contrast to the submissive current government, Tito the communist actually stood up to Moscow and successfully resisted Stalin. Even Milošević maintained his independence from Russia and exploited Yeltsin to his advantage against Western powers.
Serbia’s economic dependence on Russia continues to expand, particularly in the energy field. In January 2021, Belgrade defied U.S. calls to reduce its dependency on Russian energy and diversify its supplies. Instead, it launched a new gas link via Bulgaria and Turkey with a 400-kilometer section of the Turkish Stream pipeline for Russian gas. Serbia depends almost entirely on Russian energy supplies and this bolsters Russia’s controls over the state.
On the military front, Serbia is following Kremlin commands. Moscow is adamant that any Serbian moves toward NATO membership will not be tolerated. Serbia is being groomed as a military outpost of Russian power and has been armed with warplanes, tanks, and anti-aircraft systems. For Putin, Serbia provides a valuable option of stirring conflicts and even triggering armed clashes in the West Balkans to distract attention from Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus, and to disguise mounting unrest in the Russian Federation. At some point, Vučić could be pushed or provoked into a military confrontation on the pretext of defending the little “Serbian world” and may even appeal to the larger “Russian world” for assistance.
The dependence of the Vučić government on Moscow’s political support is also escalating. The Kremlin’s backing of assorted nationalist groups and its extensive influence in Serbia’s information space is intended to keep Vučić in check. The coup in Montenegro in October 2016 was both an attempt to dislodge the pro-NATO government in Podgorica and a signal to Vučić that the Kremlin can replace him if he steers away from the Russian orbit. By surrendering to Putin in every major domain, Serbia has in effect become a willing victim of Moscow’s policies.
