Untangling the Kosovo-Serbia Negotiation Puzzle
The negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia have long been a focal point of European and global diplomacy, embodying the complexities of post-conflict reconciliation and international recognition.
Kosova declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, a move that Serbia and some of its allies, including Russia and China, have yet to recognize. Despite ongoing dialogue facilitated by international mediators, the normalization of relations between the two countries has remained elusive. Kurti’s election in 2021, with his strong nationalist platform and emphasis on a more assertive approach to negotiations, has introduced new dynamics into the dialogue process. His leadership promises both potential breakthroughs and increased tensions, making it imperative to closely analyze the current state of these negotiations.
Learning about the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations is crucial due to their significant impact on regional stability and EU dynamics. These talks are pivotal for resolving longstanding tensions between two nations and influence broader Balkan issues, including the political instability in Bosnia and the strained relations in North Macedonia. The outcome of these negotiations can set a precedent for conflict resolution and affect EU integration efforts. Success or failure in Kosovo-Serbia talks will ripple across the Balkans, impacting EU stability and its ability to foster cohesive regional policies.
Moreover, the involvement of global powers like NATO and Russia, with Kosovo enhancing its security forces and seeking closer ties with NATO and Serbia focusing on strengthening its military capabilities and fostering relationships with Russia and China for defense support, amplifies the stakes, leaving no doubts on how relevant the pursuit of diplomatic solutions is.
A Timeline of the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
In April 2007, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presented the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan) to the UN Security Council. This proposal, consisting of a main text with 15 articles and 12 annexes, aimed to ensure Kosovo’s independence while protecting the rights and culture of its non-Albanian communities. It included provisions for a multi-ethnic democracy, a new constitution, extensive decentralization, and international oversight. Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 in line with the plan, committing to implement its recommendations and welcoming international supervision.
Following the 2010 decision by the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the initiation of Kosovo-Serbia dialogue under EU mediation. In 2011, the Kosovo Assembly voted to authorize the government to start technical dialogue with Serbia. In 2012 the Assembly passed a new resolution authorizing the commencement of political dialogue with Serbia.
From October 2012, Kosovo’s then-Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi and Serbia’s then-Prime Minister Ivica Dačić held ten rounds of talks aimed at reaching an agreement on the principles of normalizing relations.
On April 19, 2013, the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia was signed by the prime ministers of both countries under the mediation of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton. This agreement was ratified by the Kosovo Assembly on June 27, 2013, giving it the status of an international agreement, at least from Kosovo’s perspective.
On the other hand, the Serbian Parliament did not ratify the agreement, arguing that it did not constitute an agreement between two states. Upon the request of one of the parliamentary groups, the agreement was referred to Serbia’s Constitutional Court, which declined to consider it, deeming it a political rather than a legal act.
This agreement, also known as the Brussels Agreement, was an attempt by the EU to resolve issues between the two states, including 15 points addressing:
- The establishment of an association/community of Serb-majority municipalities;
- The integration of parallel Serbian structures in the north into the Kosovo Police;
- The appointment of a regional police commander for the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north;
- The integration of judicial authorities and the creation of a panel with a Serb majority to handle cases in Serb-majority municipalities as a division of the Appeals Court in Pristina;
- The organization of local elections in the northern municipalities facilitated by the OSCE and in accordance with Kosova law.
The implementation plan for the Brussels Agreement included specific timelines, many of which were not respected, and highlighted the need for further political dialogue for its execution. Political developments in Kosovo and Serbia, along with the 2014 European Parliament elections, brought a new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and a renewed effort to restart the dialogue.
In 2015, under the leadership of former prime ministers Isa Mustafa and Aleksandar Vučić, the two countries reached a series of agreements stemming from the April 19th agreement.
These agreements aimed at intensifying discussions on energy and telecommunications and preventing mutual obstruction on the path toward EU membership.
Tensions peaked when Kosova imposed a 100% tariff on imports from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on November 21, 2018, in response to Serbia’s aggressive campaign against Kosova’s INTERPOL membership and efforts to revoke recognition of Kosova. This tariff was used by Serbia as a pretext to suspend dialogue, leading to a period of entrenched positions. The international community, including the EU and the US, pressured Kosovo to lift the tariff.
Serbia’s campaign to revoke recognition of Kosova also hindered normalization, receiving inadequate condemnation from the international community. After the tariff’s imposition, then-Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj criticized EU High Representative Federica Mogherini for allowing non-transparent dialogue, including discussions on territorial changes between the two countries. The idea of border corrections or land swaps, opposed by the majority of Kosovans, caused significant political polarization domestically and internationally. Germany and France opposed border changes, while the US did not preclude any specific agreement content.
The EU’s role in facilitating dialogue diminished further during its 2019 election year, compounded by Germany and France’s failure to resume dialogue. Kosovo’s mid-2019 elections and subsequent delays in forming institutions also postponed dialogue resumption.
Kurti’s Administration: the Ohrid Agreement
The (re-)election of Albin Kurti as the Prime Minister of Kosova in February, 2021 marked a crucial moment in the history of negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade. His return to office signified a renewed and potentially transformative phase in the dialogue, as he has ever since made his foreign affairs strategy very clear: assertiveness, commitment to Kosovo’s sovereignty and strategic interests, coupled with a wise use of international support and public transparency are at the core of the new approach. This results in Kurti avoiding agreements that could lead to further demands or concessions in the future, focusing instead on securing clear, definitive outcomes.
It is with this mindset that Prishtina has prepared to engage in one of the most crucial negotiation tables: the Ohrid meeting, held in North Macedonia on March 18, 2023. In this occasion, Kosova’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić discussed the Franco-German initiative for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations, which was “packaged” as de facto recognition and as an agreement that paves the way for de jure recognition.
At the time, the EU’s High Representative, Josep Borrell, had declared in the media that “the parties expressed their readiness to move towards the implementation of the agreement,” but the Ohrid Annex remains stagnant. As a matter of fact, one of the meeting participants, Marc Weller, a proven international expert on Prime Minister Kurti’s team, believes that approach of the EU when reaching this long-awaited deal was undeniably asymmetric. According to him, it was the EU mediators who suddenly disrupted this agreement, just when Kosovo was ready to accept the Franco-German proposal. After both parties had agreed on the formulations of the Brussels Agreement on February 27, 2023, at the Ohrid meeting the parties were only supposed to formally adopt the Basic Agreement and the Implementation Annex. But again, the “old Serbian game” of not signing the agreement resurfaced. It is very evident from Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić’s letter to the EU in December 2023, which marked the peak of the denial of the Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid Annex, that this agreement does not present a legal obligation or de facto recognition for Serbia, even though European mediators insist on this direction.
Thus, at present, the situation remains at a standstill. Given Serbia’s complete unwillingness to recognize Kosova, no measures have been effectively implemented to advance in the negotiations, except for those related to missing persons and the recognition of license plates. In May 2023, Kurti and Vučić approved the Declaration on Missing Persons from the Kosova War, committing both parties to grant access to all documents they possess, including confidential ones.
Both sides also recognized each other’s vehicle license plates. In fact, from January this year, citizens of Kosova no longer cover state symbols with white stickers when driving in Serbia, and vice versa.
Among the latest developments, the most notable concerns the sequencing plan for implementing the Basic Agreement. The deadline to submit respective proposals regarding the latter was set for July 18th.
A day after the European Union’s deadline for Kosova and Serbia, a statement by Serbian Prime Minister Milos Vucevic has once again sparked reactions about the validity of this agreement, which the parties agreed upon last year. As a matter of fact, in a session held on July 24, 2024, in the Serbian Parliament, Vucevic stated that Serbia has not signed and will not sign anything that confirms Kosova’s statehood.
Regarding this issue, the EU has reiterated that the parties are aware of the obligations from the dialogue they have undertaken to implement as well as reminded that the agreement is an obligation for Serbia under Chapter 35, in its path towards integration into the European Union.
On the other side, Kosovo’s vice Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi confirmed that Kosovo had submitted its comments and accused the European Union of never presenting Serbia’s proposals to Kosova.
Setting aside the northern tensions, the ongoing back-and-forth between Kosovan and Serbian institutions, and interventions from high-profile entities like the EU and the US, recent months have yielded little progress in the dialogue. Instead, they have underscored the persistent difficulty in breaking the deadlock. What makes the dialogue between these conflicting parties so challenging? And, more critically, why do both sides find any compromise unacceptable?
Among the key issues under discussion since the ratification of the Ahtisaari Plan, two stand out as particularly contentious, due to the potentially dangerous and somehow generally underestimated consequences associated with an imprudent and superficial handling of these issues: the matter of Orthodox churches in Kosova and the establishment of the Serbian Municipalities Association.
The Matter of Orthodox Churches in Kosova
The Orthodox Serbian heritage in Kosova, exemplified by the historic Visoki Dečani and Gračanica monasteries, plays a significant and contentious role in the ongoing negotiations between Kosova and Serbia. These sites, which are part of UNESCO World Heritage, are deeply revered by Serbs as symbols of their cultural and religious identity, dating back to the medieval Serbian Empire. In the context of Kosova’s independence, the protection and status of these monasteries have become focal points in diplomatic discussions, with Serbia insisting on their protection as essential to preserving its heritage.
However, the concerns surrounding these sites extend far beyond the fear of potential damage. Thus, it would come as no surprise if these religious and cultural symbols were indeed to be exploited as some form of facilities to engage in geopolitical maneuvers.
This complex interplay between cultural heritage and political ambitions is highlighted by Erich Rathfelder, a renowned German publicist and expert on Southeastern Europe, in his book Kosovo. Rathfelder argues that “many did not understand that the outlines of Greater Serbia precisely include those territories where Serbian church organizations exist, even when Orthodox Christians there are in the minority (…) And naturally, even in Kosovo, the contours of Greater Serbia align with those of church organization.”
This raises the question: can the preservation and promotion of Orthodox Serbian heritage in Kosova indeed serve as a tool for political leverage?
The terrorist attack occurred in Banjskë, Zveçan, on September 24, 2023, where a Kosovo police officer was killed in the line of duty and three terrorists from the armed group led by Milan Radojičić, the former vice-chairman of the Serbian List, were killed, has undeniably thrust the issue back into the spotlight, raising questions about the extent to which the Orthodox clergy may be entangled with Serbian interests. It is worth noting that, in fact, on September 25, 2023 the Eparchy of Raška-Prizren, part of the Serbian Orthodox Church, announced that EULEX and Kosova police conducted an investigation that day at the Banjskë monastery in northern Kosova, finding firearms and other military equipment in the monastery grounds “which were discarded by those fleeing the monastery.”
The police found maps and plans in the monastery and the vehicles, indicating a long, well-thought-out plan. “We are dealing here not with local groups, but with a terrorist organization directly controlled from Belgrade. An operation with such a large amount of weapons must be prepared over several months.”, Xhelal Sveçla, Minister of Internal Affairs of Kosova, claimed.
In the following days, Sveçla shared a video on Facebook showing Milan Radojičić, the vice-chairman of the Serbian List, as well as other evidence that, according to him, clearly shows official connections between the Serbian state and the terrorist group. He also revealed that one of the fatalities in the terrorist attack was Bojan Mijailović, a bodyguard of the Serbian BIA chief, Aleksandar Vulin.
The ASM
The Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM) in Kosovo is a proposed body intended to enhance the self-administration and governance of Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo: North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić, Zvečan, Štrpce, Klokot, Gračanica, Novo Brdo, Ranilug and Parteš. This initiative stems from the Brussels Agreement signed in 2013.
Zajednica is intended to facilitate self-governance for Serb communities in areas such as education, healthcare, and local economic development, while remaining under Kosova’s legal framework. However, its implementation has been stalled due to disagreements over the extent of its powers and concerns about its impact on Kosova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The issue officially came out for the first time in December 2015, when Kosova’s Constitutional Court reviewed the principles agreed upon in the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Kosova and Serbia, which included the creation of the ASM. The Court ruled that some of these principles violated Kosova’s Constitution. Specifically, the Court identified that 23 articles of the Constitution, particularly those related to the equality of citizens before the law, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the rights of minority communities, would be compromised by the formation of the ASM as it was proposed.
Concerns have also been raised regarding the powers vested in the association, the potential for it to adopt a monoethnic character, and the risk of “Bosnianization” of the Kosovar state. As for the first point, Kurti has repeatedly rejected any arrangement that would grant the ASM executive powers, which he believes would compromise Kosova’s unity. He argues that the association should be purely consultative or coordinating, without decision-making authority that could lead to autonomy or self-governance distinct from the rest of Kosova.
On top of this, critics argue that granting extensive powers to such an association could undermine the multiethnic fabric of Kosova, leading to a segregated governance model similar to that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic divisions have led to persistent political instability. This scenario is feared to exacerbate ethnic tensions and fragment Kosovo’s governance, as the establishment of a bosnian Republika Srpska-like entity in Kosovo would challenge its sovereignty and the principles of unity that the state strives to uphold as well as meddle decision-making policies within Kosova’s legal framework.
Thus, such a mono-ethnic project without a legally binding agreement and without de jure recognition still gives Belgrade an extremely powerful lever to undermine the internal functionality of the state of Kosova.
It’s essential to note that Kosovo never rejected the Association; on the contrary, it created the foundations of this dialogue process. However, in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan, the formation of the ASM is not seen as a replacement for the Kosova system but rather as part of the functioning system of the state of Kosovo. In line with this approach, Kurti emphasized the need to keep the priorities in order: first comes the Basic Agreement, then the implementation annex, and only after that can the issue of the Association be addressed.
Conclusion
Among the different possible solutions that have been brought up throughout the time, border modifications and territorial swaps are unlikely to be a viable option, given the complexities involved and, on Kosova’s side, the limited economic incentive of the maneuver, due to the underdevelopment of Preseva Valley in terms of resources, infrastructure, or any investment potential.
Thus, the path to a sustainable diplomatic solution between Kosova and Serbia hinges mainly on the principle of reciprocity, a stance repeatedly emphasized by Kosova’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti. Without Serbia’s willingness to engage in genuine recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and address the core issue of reciprocity, any discussion on establishing an Association of Serb-majority municipalities remains premature and unjustifiable. Kosovo has already extended significant rights to its Serb minority, including comprehensive local governance autonomy, educational and cultural rights, and proportional representation in both local and national institutions. Notably, the Srpska List’s political influence far exceeds its demographic representation, as ten out of one-hundred and twenty seats in the Kosova Assembly are guaranteed to the party, resulting in a disproportionate level of power when compared to other minority groups, which, however, came as a necessary political compromise stemming from the Brussels Agreement of 2013 in order to avoid further setbacks.
It is true that integration cannot occur without a proper recognition of rights, yet it is equally important to acknowledge that there are limits to how much integration can be achieved when a minority struggles to recognize and engage with the institutions of its own state. This is particularly pertinent when that minority continues to operate within a legal and electoral framework that was, in part, established to protect their rights. It is no longer feasible to ignore the evident reluctance among Serbs to reconcile with Kosovo’s institutions. This resistance is unmistakably shown by the frequent boycotts of elections at both local and national levels. A prime example is the recent 2023 municipal elections in four predominantly Serbian municipalities, followed by a referendum to remove the mayors, which came just a year after the initial protests and clashes further fueled by Lista Srpska. In this context, the upcoming 2024 census of Kosova’s population promises to be particularly revealing. Given the Serbian minority’s previous boycott of the 2011 census, which also happens to be the only one conducted thus far, there are expectations that a similar pattern of non-participation will emerge this time around.
In light of these developments, what can we anticipate for the future of the negotiations? The upcoming changes in EU leadership and the anticipated 2025 elections in Kosova are pivotal events expected to influence the trajectory of the talks. However, they are not the only factors at play. The political party Vetëvendosje is looking for increased determination in pursuing a diplomatic resolution and concrete outcomes from the newly elected High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. Their hope is that Kallas will adopt a more assertive strategy to achieve tangible results and advance the negotiation process in a way that won’t damage Kosovo interests.
Indeed, the prospect of asymmetric treatment in the negotiations continues to be a major concern. There is growing anxiety about the potential imbalance in how the parties are addressed and engaged, which could undermine the fairness and effectiveness of the negotiation process.
This concern is particularly salient in light of recent developments, such as the tentative deal between Serbia and the European Union praised by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
The deal between Serbia and the European Union signed on July 19, 2024, paves the way for the disputed excavation of lithium, resulting in a project that could reduce Europe’s dependency on China. Scholz participated in a “critical raw materials summit” in Belgrade, where he witnessed the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Serbian government. This agreement establishes a “strategic partnership” focused on sustainable raw materials, battery supply chains, and electric vehicles.
The deal not only highlights Serbia’s increasing leverage, but also raises questions about whether such high-profile agreements could contribute to an imbalance in how the EU engages with both Serbia and Kosova.
Hope remains for Kosova as it advances toward membership in the Council of Europe, with its application having been submitted a year ago. However, the path ahead is still steep, as Kosova must still meet several key standards, including the establishment of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) that has been added as such in previous months. In fact, On April 16, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe endorsed a report by Dora Bakoyannis, advocating for Kosovo’s membership in the organization. The report concluded that Kosova has met all the necessary conditions for membership, framing the formation of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities as an internal issue for Kosova. However, key European nations have made their support contingent on concrete progress toward establishing the Association, making this a critical factor in the final vote. This requirement was emphasized in a letter sent to Prime Minister Albin Kurti on May 15 of this year, signed by French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
As the dialogue between Kosova and Serbia unfolds, what the future holds for both countries remains uncertain, with current and emerging dynamics likely to influence the trajectory of negotiations. What is clear is that a commitment to finding a diplomatic solution is essential. If Kosova is to avoid compromising its interests, Kurti will need to remain steadfast. But apparently, Vucic is matching Kurti’s determination with equal resolve. [Aleph Analisi Strategiche]
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